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Abstract: Since the emergence of the virtual currency Bitcoin in 2009, a new, Internet-based 
way of recording entitlements and enforcing rights has increasingly captured the interest of 
businesses and governments. The technology is commonly called ‘blockchain’ and is often 
associated with a closely related phenomenon, the ‘smart contract’. The market is now 
exploring ways of using these concepts for financial assets, such as securities, fiat money and 
derivative contracts. This article develops a conceptual framework for the governance of 
blockchain-based networks in financial markets. It constructs a vision of how financial 
regulation and private law should set the boundaries of this new technology in order to protect 
market participants and societies at large, while at the same time allowing for the necessary 
room for innovation 
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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I will explore the regulatory and private law issues arising from the 
use of blockchain networks in financial markets, including relevant issues 
pertaining to the control of such networks and to the influence of the market on 
their development. I refer to the entirety of these aspects as ‘governance’, 
intentionally adopting a broad understanding of this term.1 The analysis establishes 
whether and to what extent blockchain-based business models can exist outside 
the regulatory and supervisory perimeter that generally applies to financial 
institutions. It further investigates the role of private law within these networks, 
notably in ensuring the smooth functioning of risk-based regulation and in 
avoiding a risk-shift towards non-adjusting third parties. Lastly, the article assesses 
the need for cross-jurisdictional co-ordination. It is conceived as a mapping 
exercise, constructing a vision of the core governance issues and their 
interdependencies, thus providing the conceptual foundation for a future 
governance framework.  
The emergence of blockchain technology has become inextricably linked 
to Bitcoin,2 a ‘virtual currency’ that allows users to trade ‘bitcoins’ directly from 
peer to peer without involving banks or other intermediaries.3 Whereas Bitcoin in 
theory is nothing more than a unit of account, it has in practice developed 
functions akin to those of money, in particular since it can be freely exchanged 
against currency and is regularly used to store value.4 Bitcoin has also risen to 
prominence as a means of payment (over 100,000 retailers accept bitcoins)5 and as 
                                                      
1 See M. Bevir, Key Concepts in Governance (London; Thousand Oaks CA, Sage 2009) 29-30. 
2 G.W. Peters and E. Panayi, ‘Understanding Modern Banking Ledgers through Blockchain Technologies: 
Future of Transaction Processing and Smart Contracts on the Internet of Money’, (Working Paper 18 
Nov. 2015), 3 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692487, visited 30 Nov. 
2016. 
3 The paper that laid the foundations for Bitcoin and the blockchain technology is S. Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: 
A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (Working Paper 2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf visited 
30 Nov. 2016; for a comprehensive description Peters and Panayi, n 2, 2-9; for technical but still 
accessible description E. Wall and G. Malm, ‘Using Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts to 
Create a Distributed Securities Depository’ (Master Thesis Lund University 2016), 5-23 at 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8885750&fileOId=8885765 
visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
4 See C. Procter, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money (OUP, 7th ed, 2012), 1.170-1.172.  
5 A. Cuthbertson, ‘Bitcoins now accepted by 100.000 retailers worldwide’ (International Business Times 4 
February 2015), at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-now-accepted-by-100000-merchants-worldwide-
1486613, visited 30 Nov. 2016. See also www.coindesk.com/information/what-can-you-buy-with-
bitcoins/, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
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a means of speculation6 beyond the circles of Internet aficionados in the space of 
just a few years. It has also gained notoriety as being susceptible to speculative 
bubbles, and as the object of criminal activity.7 Given these characteristics, virtual 
currencies have ‘a good claim of being regarded as money’.8 However, legal 
categorisation is unclear and a new legal category might be needed to recognise 
‘virtual choses in possession’ as a new form of property.9 
The easiest way to understand what blockchain technology stands for is to 
think of it as an Internet-based database to store entitlements, of which identical 
copies of equal constitutive value are held by every network participant. The 
database enables each participant to trade these entitlements by instructing the 
database software accordingly, which will then autonomously and irreversibly 
effect the relevant changes to the network participants’ holdings (in addition to 
‘database’, the terms ‘ledger’ and ‘record’ are also used). This was the idea 
originally introduced with the Bitcoin network. Later on, blockchain networks 
emerged that were more flexible in terms of what could be recorded in the 
database, the most important of these probably being the Ethereum network, which 
also allows users to trade entitlements but which can, in addition, record and 
autonomously run self-executable programmes, the so-called ‘smart contracts’.10  
Meanwhile, the technology has been extended further to take in ‘real’ 
things,11 and may soon be used for a wide range of financial assets, ie those assets 
that, unlike virtual currencies, represent a claim against another party. With such 
technology, shares or bonds could be issued,12 traded and settled on the 
                                                      
6 See N. Mancini, ‘Bitcoin: Rischi e Difficoltà Normative’, (2016) Banca Impresa Società 35(1), 131-134; 
I. Kaminska, ‘The Mt. Gox Bitcoin Bubble’ (Financial Times 4 August 2016), 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/08/04/2136420/the-mt-gox-bitcoin-bubble/, visited 30 Nov. 2016 
7 See Kaminska, ibid; K. Scannell, ‘Founder of Silk Road given Life in Prison’ (Financial Times 29 May 
2015), at www.ft.com/content/8694f87c-0646-11e5-89c1-00144feabdc0, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
8 Financial Markets Law Committee, ‘Issues of legal uncertainty arising in the context of virtual 
currencies’ (2016) 23, at http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/virtual_currencies.pdf 
visited 7 May 2017.  
9 ibid. 
10 See https://ethereum.org, visited 30 Nov. 2016; K. Werbach, ‘Trustless Trust’ (Working Paper August 
2016), 31 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2844409, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
11 For instance diamonds (http://www.everledger.io), government services in Estonia ranging from 
healthcare to electronic court procedures (https//e-estonia.com/component), visited 30 Nov. 2016), 
crowdfunding applications (see A. Sunnarborg, ‘Blockchain Startups Make Up 20% of Largest 
Crowdfunding Projects’ [Venturebeat 15 May 2016], 
http://venturebeat.com/2016/05/15/blockchain-startups-make-up-20-of-largest-crowdfunding-
projects/, visited 30 Nov. 2016), and music royalties (G. Howard, ‘Bitcoin for Rock stars – A Year 
Later’ [Forbes 25 September 2015], 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgehoward/2015/09/25/bitcoin-for-rock-stars-a-year-later-an-
update-from-d-a-wallach-on-blockchain-and-the-arts-part-1/#cd82c6522493, visited 30 Nov. 2016.). 
12 See G. Chavez-Dreyfuss, ‘Overstock to Issue Stock to be traded on Blockchain Platform’ (Reuters 16 
March 2016), www.reuters.com/article/us-overstock-bitcoin-stocks-idUSKCN0WI2YA, visited 30 
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blockchain networks, thereby replacing stock exchanges, clearing houses and 
settlement systems.13 Indeed, the technology could be used to make all kinds of 
payment,14 and central banks could issue fiat money in this way.15 Likewise, 
derivative contracts could be concluded, administered and settled within 
blockchain networks.16 In this article, I refer to these and similar emerging 
structures (to the exclusion of virtual currencies) as ‘blockchain financial 
networks’. 
The financial industry has already spent over 1.4bn USD on research into 
blockchain17 as it is expecting immense benefits from moving to the new 
technology; banks are hoping to save 15-20bn USD on their infrastructure by 
2022.18 At the same time, Fintech businesses are preparing to enter the financial 
market with innovative blockchain-based services,19 while regulators and 
                                                                                                                                         
Nov. 2016; Nasdaq, ‘Nasdaq Linq enables first-ever private securities issuance documented with 
blockchain technology’ (Press release 30 December 2015), 
http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=948326, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
13 See DTCC, ‘Embracing Disruption—Tapping the Potential of Distributed Ledgers to Improve the 
Post-Trade Landscape’ (January 2016), at www.dtcc.com/news/2016/january/25/blockchain-white-
paper, visited 30 Nov. 2016; Euroclear and Slaughter and May, ‘Blockchain Settlement—Regulation, 
Innovation and Application’ (November 2016), at www.euroclear.com/en/campaigns/Blockchain-
settlement-Regulation-innovation-and-application.html, visited 30 Nov. 2016; Euroclear and Oliver 
Wyman, ‘Blockchain in Capital Markets’ (February 2010), at 
www.euroclear.com/en/campaigns/blockchain-in-capital-markets.html, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
14 See, eg Ripple (Settlement of international wholesale payments) https://ripple.com; Circle (consumer 
payment services in EUR, USD, GBP) www.circle.com/en-gb.  
15 See B. Broadbent, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, ‘Central Banks and Digital Currencies’ 
(Speech at London School of Economics and Political Science 2 March 2016), at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2016/886.aspx, visited 30 Nov. 2016; J. 
Wild, ‘Central banks explore blockchain to create digital money’ (Financial Times 2 Nov. 2016), at 
www.ft.com/content/f15d3ab6-750d-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a, visited 30 Nov. 2016; A. Sharp, Bank 
of Canada to publish payment experiment result in coming months’ (Reuters 20 Nov. 2016), at 
www.reuters.com/article/canada-cenbank-blockchain-
idUSL1N1D31J5?feedType=RSS&feedName=bondsNews, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
16 See L. Brain, ‘Barclay’s Smart Contract Templates’ (video London 18 April 2016), at 
https://www.r3cev.com/projects/, visited 30 Nov. 2016; A. Karphal, ‘Barclay’s used blockchain 
technology to trade derivatives, (CNBC 19 April 2016), at www.cnbc.com/2016/04/19/barclays-used-
blockchain-tech-to-trade-derivatives.html, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
17 See World Economic Forum, ‘The future of Financial Infrastructure’ (August 2016), 14 at 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-future-of-financial-infrastructure-an-ambitious-look-at-how-
blockchain-can-reshape-financial-services/, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
18 See Santander, ‘Fintech 2.0—Rebooting Financial Services’ (June 2016), 
https://www.finextra.com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/the%20fintech%202%200%20paper.pdf, 
visited 30 Nov. 2016.  
19 See for examples n 14 and Clearmatics (securities and derivatives settlement) 
http://www.clearmatics.com; Epiphyte (foreign exchange settlement) http://epiphyte.com.  
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legislators are considering how to accommodate the new technology.20 Yet 
however great the current interest in blockchain technology, its adoption is still in 
its early infancy and very much in flux. Potential applications range from the 
original, highly disruptive concept underlying Bitcoin or Ethereum, which involves 
open, largely anonymous, unregulated peer-to-peer networks that eliminate the 
need for financial intermediaries, to rather unspectacular projects that use only 
certain parts of the blockchain technology, notably the distributed database, to 
modernise and harmonise IT infrastructure in a quest for greater efficiency 
without attempting to overthrow existing market structures.21  
The disruptive potential of blockchain technology applies not only to 
existing business models but also threatens the effectiveness of the existing 
governance framework for financial markets, depending on how the technology is 
deployed. It is important, therefore, to set the axioms of a governance framework 
for blockchain financial networks at an early stage in order to further a potentially 
beneficial market development and avoid the cost of adjusting market practice to 
new rules at a later stage.22  
My starting point in the second part of this article will be an analysis of the 
three ground-breaking characteristics of blockchain networks (ie, distributed 
ledgers, the immutability of the acquisition process and the record, and the 
possible storage of auto-executable smart contracts in a blockchain database) that 
could effect structural changes in market practice and may render traditional 
governance concepts ineffective. 
The third part of this article contemplates the characteristics of blockchain 
technology in the light of existing financial regulation. Originally, blockchain 
technology was conceived for state-remote networks, ie networks entirely self-
governed on the basis of consensus amongst their users. Nevertheless, blockchain 
financial networks may create risks that might have an impact on the wider 
market, notably by transmitting systemic risk, discriminating between market 
actors and facilitating illegal activity. Hence, blockchain financial networks cannot 
remain outside the regulatory perimeter. 
The fourth part of this article looks at private law and the treatment of 
individual rights in blockchain financial networks. Here, crucially, software may be 
                                                      
20 See European Parliament, Resolution of 26 May 2016 on Virtual Currencies, Doc. No. 
P8_TA(2016)0228); Financial Conduct Authority (UK), ‘Financial Conduct Authority unveils 
successful sandbox firms on the second anniversary of Project Innovate’ (Press release, 7 Nov. 2016), 
at www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/financial-conduct-authority-unveils-successful-sandbox-firms-
second-anniversary, visited on 30 Nov. 2016. 
21 See n 13. 
22 See A. Wright and P. De Filippi, ‘Decentralized Blockchain technology and the Rise of Lex 
Cryptographia’ (Working Paper 12 March 2015), 56 at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664, visited 30 Nov. 2016.  
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seen as the sole determinant for enforceability, thus bypassing the relevant rules of 
private law and the authority of the courts. Such a strict technology-based solution 
for balancing diverging interests may be acceptable if confined to the actual parties 
to a blockchain-based transaction as an expression of their contractual freedom. 
However, since third parties and the market at large may also be affected, the issue 
of enforceability of rights cannot be left entirely to the software, even if the parties 
themselves agree to transact following the internal rules of the network. 
The fifth part of the article discusses two factors that are instrumental in 
shaping regulatory and legislative strategies appropriate for a range of future 
applications of blockchain technology to financial transactions. The first such 
factor is the extent to which regulated financial institutions are involved in 
blockchain networks; if they are, much of the existing regulation can be applied. 
An equally important issue is the international reach of blockchain financial 
networks, which may render domestic governance frameworks largely ineffective, 
unless there is appropriate international co-ordination.  
The final part of the article sets out my conclusions.  
A NEW MARKET PRACTICE AND THE  
TRADITIONAL LINCHPINS OF GOVERNANCE 
Blockchain came to be counted among the ‘disruptive’ technologies very early on, 
ie, it was spotted as one of those typically Internet-based platforms that have the 
potential of unravelling traditional market structures, as has happened in other 
areas such as transport by taxi (Uber), holiday accommodation (Airbnb) and 
telecommunications (WhatsApp). Typically, disruptive technologies may modify 
the value chain of a traditional business, thereby threatening the incumbents’ 
income models.  
Blockchain technology enables disrupters and incumbents to 
reconceptualise business models in financial markets. As a result, existing ways of 
trading and administering financial assets might change considerably were 
blockchain technology to be adopted on a wider scale. However, the resulting 
changes will affect a number of aspects that today serve as linchpins linking 
regulation and private law to market practice. These elements are deeply anchored 
in our understanding of how financial markets work and how we govern them. If 
they disappear or change, governance strategies will need to be adapted 
accordingly. 
Three characteristics of blockchain technology have the potential of turning our 
understanding of how the market functions upside down, and may affect the 
current governance framework accordingly, as will see later in the third and the 
fourth part. First, the concept of the distributed ledger that lies at the heart of 
blockchain affects the central role of intermediation and client accounts or, more 
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broadly, intermediary-client relationships; secondly, fail-proof, automated 
acquisition processes and immutable records replace trust in intermediaries and 
create a new form of truth; and lastly, blockchain technology renders the 
execution of smart contracts truly unstoppable, which means that, in the absence 
of built-in circuit breakers, all human discretion is excised from the execution and 
enforcement of contractual duties. 
Distributed databases, disintermediation and the disappearance of client 
accounts 
Financial transactions, such as the payment of money, the sale and purchase of 
securities, the exchange of currencies or derivative contracts, in principle represent 
a bilateral relationship between the relevant parties. However, they are typically 
concluded, administered or settled using intermediaries such as banks or brokers, 
and financial market infrastructures such as stock exchanges, payment systems, 
securities settlement systems or derivatives central counterparties. Intermediaries 
and infrastructures form networks that link financial market actors with one 
another. These networks are traditionally ordered either in a centralised or a 
decentralised fashion.  
Centralised networks rely on a single record in which all transactions and 
holdings are recorded by a trusted central entity; only thus can market participants 
reach consensus on relevant facts, in particular their holdings.23 In several 
countries, for instance, a central securities depository maintains securities accounts 
for all market participants that invest in securities. All acquisitions and dispositions 
are recorded in that register, and each individual balance is retrievable there.24 
Decentralised networks, on the other hand, are characterised by a structure in which 
different records together provide complete information on transactions and 
holdings. No single record on its own holds that comprehensive information. For 
instance, in some jurisdictions the central securities depository records the 
transactions and holdings of banks and brokers but not of end-investors. The 
assumption is that these banks and brokers will record the identity of investors to 
whom the securities ultimately belong in their own ledgers.25 
Different as they may be, the centralised and decentralised financial 
network models do share an important feature: the original two-party relationship 
between the parties to a transaction (seller-buyer) is replaced by several two-party 
relationships between the parties and their intermediary and, as the case might be, 
                                                      
23 ibid, 5. 
24 See Unidroit, ‘Working Paper regarding so-called Transparent Systems’ (2006 Unidroit S78-44), 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2006/study78/s-78-044-e.pdf, visited 30 Nov. 2016.  
25 See P. Paech, ‘Securities, Intermediation and the Blockchain—An Inevitable Choice between Liquidity 
and Legal Certainty’, (2016) Uniform Law Review 21(4), 8-10. 
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 8 
between additional intermediaries providing the necessary links in the network.26 
The technical process of recording an entitlement to an asset takes place on the IT 
system of the relevant intermediary. This record is associated with the legal 
relationship between the intermediary and its client, generally called an account or, 
more broadly, the client relationship. In modern financial markets, this account or 
client relationship is one of the linchpins of financial regulation and private law: 
property rights are defined by and contractual duties arise from it, as do a plethora 
of behavioural rules set by financial regulation.  
By contrast, blockchain technology is based on the idea of a distributed 
record. Here, each participant in the network (‘node’), in practice a computer 
server controlled by a market participant and fitted with the relevant blockchain 
platform software, maintains a complete record of past transactions. All nodes are 
constantly updated with information on the latest transactions. As a consequence, 
all transaction information is available at any node at any given point in time, is 
identical and has equal constitutive value, ie there are no master and subordinated 
records.27 Thus, blockchain introduces an organising principle into the financial 
markets that is not built on a two-party relationship between investors and 
intermediaries and between intermediaries and infrastructures.28 There are no 
intermediaries, hence no accounts or other intermediary-client relationships within 
the blockchain network, so that an important linchpin of financial regulation and 
private law concepts is missing within the network itself.  
However, intermediation may still occur outside the network. Nodes may 
have clients which are not part of the network. In such a scenario they may 
transact on the network in their own name but on behalf of these clients, ie 
operate as intermediaries for persons outside the network.29 
Considering the ‘disintermediation’ within the network itself it becomes 
clear that there is enormous potential to change the market. In order to 
understand it we must consider the current ecosystem of financial holdings and 
transactions. Financial intermediaries and infrastructures are only rarely involved 
in moving tangible assets around. Banks hold book-money in electronic accounts 
and transfer it through electronic payment systems. Similarly, shares, bonds and 
derivatives are typically incorporeal and purely account-based. In fact, the lion’s 
                                                      
26 ibid, 15-16. 
27 Nakamoto, n 3, section 5; P. De Filippi and B Loveluck, ‘The invisible Politics of Bitcoin: Governance 
crisis of a decentralised Infrastructure’, 5(3) Internet Policy Review (2016), 7-8 at 
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/invisible-politics-bitcoin-governance-crisis-decentralised-
infrastructure, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
28 Wright and De Filippi, n 22, 2. 
29 See below [000]. 
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share of the services provided by the financial service industry relates to data 
storage and data processing.  
However, the relevant IT systems they use differ considerably: as between 
different types of asset, different types of service provided in relation to an asset, 
different jurisdictions and even as between individual financial institutions. The 
same asset is typically mirrored repeatedly in different systems maintained by 
different entities, potentially in different jurisdictions. This historically generated 
multiplication and diversification of records and account relationships leaves 
ample room for inefficiencies and operational and legal risk:30 the constant 
reconciliation of these records is costly and slow; there are frequent temporary 
mismatches; investors are increasingly disconnected from issuers because the 
relevant investor rights are degraded down to the smallest feature common to all 
accounts used to hold a specific security;31 extracting aggregate data, for example 
for supervisory purposes, is a cumbersome exercise that often results in 
unsatisfactory results;32 as a given asset appears in different independent records it 
may be unclear which record is constitutive and which is only for book-keeping 
purposes; or, for the same reason, an asset may be used simultaneously by 
different parties, eg it might be pledged by different market participants for their 
own purposes, simply because the same asset appears in various accounts.33  
In the case of distributed records used in blockchain networks, all parties 
involved in holding and administering an asset have an up-to date copy of the 
same record at their disposal at all times, a record that is so designed as to exclude 
mismatches with the other copies.34 In addition, blockchain technology allows for 
greater data depth. That is, records are able to store more complex information 
than accounts typically can today.35 For instance, a traditional securities account 
with a broker records ownership of securities but nothing else. More in-depth 
information in relation to these securities needs to be generated and held in 
separate records. In a future blockchain-based setting, information as to 
ownership of a specific share could extend to information as to which service 
providers are involved in its administration, whether the share is encumbered and 
if so, in whose favour. In addition, self-executing programmes, so-called ‘smart 
contracts’ (which I will discuss below), can be recorded together with the 
                                                      
30 Paech, n 25, 15-22. 
31 See E. Micheler, ‘Custody Chains and Asset Values: why crypto-securities are worth contemplating’ 
(2015) Cambridge Law Journal 74(3), 509-519. 
32 See Euroclear and Oliver Wyman, n 13, 7. 
33 See Peters and Panayi, n 3, 22-23 for an overview of the various ledgers held within a financial 
institution for accounting and regulatory purposes. 
34 See Nakamoto, n 3, 3-4; Wall and Malmo, n 3, 8-16. 
35 P. Ortolani, ‘Self-enforcing Online Dispute Resolution: Lessons from Bitcoin’ (2016) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 36(3), 595, 608.  
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ownership information and could, for instance, automatically process dividend or 
interest payments once they are due.  
In other words, the industry could move from a multitude of records 
relating to the same asset and maintained for different purposes, and which are 
not properly co-ordinated, to a single record36 distributed amongst and used by all 
parties, or at least significantly reduce the number of different records. Because 
the blockchain record is distributed amongst all nodes, the relevant financial 
institutions and infrastructures are able to provide their services in relation to a 
specific asset on the basis of the same information. Significant parts of the 
financial industry, including most ‘global players’, have identified these benefits as 
their common interest and have formed consortia supporting technology start-
ups, such as the R3CEV and Hyperledger, that are currently developing the relevant 
blockchain software.37  
As a consequence, the considerable operational complications caused by 
multiple records could be removed in the future, as would be the associated 
uncertainty and cost. The speed of settling transactions would increase.38 At the 
same time, reporting to the competent supervisor would be facilitated, as the 
relevant data could be made available by giving the supervisor access to the 
blockchain record. 39  
A fail-proof system, the displacement of trust and the redefinition of truth  
A distributed record as described above is only the base component of a 
blockchain network. In particular, additional mechanisms are needed to guarantee 
that the updates of records kept by nodes reflect the truth, since practically any 
node would be in a position to propose updates to the other nodes, including 
fraudulent ones.  
 Traditionally, the truthfulness of records in financial markets is ensured 
through a mechanism involving trust (in the everyday sense of the word40) and 
responsibility. Clients trust their intermediaries to keep records diligently so that 
they reflect the true state of holdings at any given time. Reputation may be the 
original bedrock of this trust, but more importantly today it is a question of 
regulation: clients typically trust financial institutions because they know they are 
                                                      
36 See Peters and Panayi, n 3, 24. 
37 See https://www.r3cev.com and https://www.hyperledger.org, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
38 See Peters and Panayi, n 3, 17, 27. 
39 See ibid, 18. 
40 Though this ‘is one of those “I know it when I see it”’, Werbach, n 10, 8, see for a discussion of ‘trust’ 
ibid, 8-15. 
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authorised and supervised.41 Clients expect intermediaries to be able to correct 
erroneous records, and to do so either voluntarily or compelled by the judiciary.42 
In other words, regardless of the outcome of the technical process of record 
keeping, intermediaries and, ultimately, the courts have the last word as to whether 
rights such as securities or cash in accounts have been acquired or lost and, hence, 
whether the relevant record entries correspond to the truth.  
By contrast, the inventors of blockchain relinquished the current model 
for ensuring truthful outcomes built on ex-ante regulation-induced trust and ex-post 
review by the courts.43 Instead, blockchain technology relies entirely on a 
technology-based solution giving nodes the certainty that transactions are correctly 
executed and accurately recorded. In addition to the idea of a distributed record 
(see preceding section), the concepts builds, first, on a process to establish 
consensus amongst nodes regarding the correctness of an update of a record on 
the basis of a mathematical-probabilistic approach (this process is called the ‘proof 
of work’ in the Bitcoin context) and, secondly, on a process by which all processed 
transactions are locked in a chain of sequential, logically intertwined sets, or 
‘blocks’, that cannot be changed – in principle44 – once a new block of 
transactions has been validated by the nodes (this latter feature is the origin of the 
term ‘blockchain’).45  
For such a system to work, however, it is imperative that no person or 
group be in a position to take control of the majority of nodes and thus of the 
validating process. This goal is achieved by conceiving the network as ‘permission-
less’,46 ie, as an open network. Anyone with the necessary (freely available) 
hardware and software can join Bitcoin, Etherium and other networks as a node 
following this strict logic. Even though this openness may allow fraudsters to join, 
the idea is that the well-nigh unlimited reservoir of computing power spread 
across the globe can theoretically be made available to the network and will always 
be greater than the computing power of a potential attacker, thus rendering the 
network tamper-proof and censorship-resistant.47 Newer blockchain networks, in 
particular those set up amongst financial institutions, depart from this logic and 
restrict access to their networks, for instance to members in a specific 
                                                      
41 See ibid, 15-16.  
42 Ortolani, n 35, 607. 
43 Nakamoto, n 3, 1; M. Raskin, ‘The Law of Smart Contracts’ (Working Paper 22 September 2016), 7 at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2842258, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
44 See text to footnotes 67-68 and 84. 
45 See Nakamoto, n 3, 1-4; Wall and Malm, n 3, 5-23.  
46 Nakamoto, n 3, 8. 
47 Nakamoto, n 3, 3; Wall and Malm, n 3, 7; for a critical assessment see De Filippi and Loveluck, n 27, 
14-17. 
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consortium.48 However, this is possible only because these networks imply some 
level of trust amongst nodes.49 Hence, the ‘permissioned’ model of blockchain 
networks is different not only in that it requires permission to access. In actual 
fact, these networks are based on fundamental assumptions different from those 
of the original blockchain technology.50  
Smart contracts and unstoppable execution 
The term ‘smart contract’ refers to computer code that is designed automatically 
to execute contractual duties upon the occurrence of a trigger event.51 The simple 
example of a vending machine has been cited to explain the concept: upon 
insertion of a specific type of coin, the computer programme instructs the 
mechanism of the machine to release the good.52 This concept was not originally 
part of the blockchain idea. It might be described as an add-on extending the 
capabilities of the blockchain network beyond its function as a keeper of records.  
A smart contract ‘excises human discretion from contract execution’.53 
Unlike the performance of contracts generally, performance on a smart contract 
cannot be stopped, neither voluntarily by the parties (ie it can neither be breached 
nor amended), nor by a central entity, nor by a court or supervisor.54 Accordingly, 
the idea of smart contracts is different from that of the automated or high-speed 
execution of contracts, as the certainty of performance is the core issue here but 
not its speed or reduced cost of labour.  
The absolute certainty of performance makes contracting much more 
efficient as the counterparty risk and settlement risk typically inherent in contracts 
are considerably reduced, if not eliminated. A simple example is the securities 
collateral kept in a blockchain network: if the debtor has not paid by a certain date, 
the smart contract autonomously transfers the securities to the creditor. 
Furthermore, the precision of the programming language is much greater than that 
of written human language; in particular, warranties and conditions can be 
                                                      
48 Peters and Panayi, n 2, 6. 
49 ibid. 
50 See ibid, 7. 
51 H. Surden, ‘Computable Contracts’ (2012) U. C. Davis L. Rev. 46, 629, 656-657; Ortolani, n 35, 608; 
Raskin, n 43, 2; J. Stark, ‘Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts’ (Coindesk 4 June 2016), at 
http://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts/, visited 30 Nov. 2016; Wright and De 
Filippi, n 22, 11.  N. Szabo, ‘Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks’ (1997) First 
Monday 2(9), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469-publisher=First, 
visited 15 Nov. 1997. 
52 Szabo, ibid. 
53 Raskin, n 43, 2. 
54 Wright and De Filippi, n 22, 25-26. 
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formulated with much greater accuracy,55 and contracts can be treated and 
processed in data formats.56 Hence, it is argued, smart contracts make transacting 
considerably less expensive owing to certainty of execution and the near-zero risk 
of litigation in court.57 
In the financial markets, smart contracts could be used for a variety of 
functions. For instance, a bond held in a blockchain network might have a smart 
contract attached to it that automatically executes interest payments on the 
payment date, and the amount to be paid is determined on the basis of data 
retrieved from a predefined, reliable Internet source. A second example relates to 
the derivatives market.58 Parties might enter derivative contracts electronically; the 
relevant building blocks of that short programme would automatically be taken 
and assembled from an electronic contract library set up to this effect. The smart 
contract could be so designed as to automatically cater for due payments to be 
executed and to adjust collateral levels between the parties. Also, upon termination 
of the contract, the programme could autonomously calculate the due termination 
amount to be paid. Again, amounts would depend on reference data sourced from 
a predefined, reliable data provider.  
Interestingly, the (older) concept of smart contracts will achieve its full 
potential only if combined with the (newer) invention of blockchain networks.59 
This is because the certainty of execution is not absolute as long as human 
discretion can interfere with the process: the vending machine is technically still 
under the control of its owner. In the context of financial markets, the issue is that 
IT systems, for example those running cash and securities accounts, are still 
controlled by a financial intermediary who can alter the process, either voluntarily 
or in compliance with a court or supervisory order. By contrast, the record of a 
blockchain network on which a smart contract is stored is supposed to be 
absolutely immutable and its execution automatic. As set out in the previous 
section, autonomy of execution is a direct consequence of the fact that blockchain 
networks operate without any central or trusted entity to balance the parties’ 
interests.60 In other words, it is only in blockchain networks that there is truly no 
ex post review of contractual duties after contract formation.61 The only way to 
influence the execution of smart contracts is by programming them in such a way 
that they seek external input on the further execution (from a non-smart, human-
controlled IT process into which they are embedded, or from an authority or 
                                                      
55 Raskin, n 43, 21-22. 
56 Surden, n 51, 690-694. 
57 See Raskin, n 43, 33; Surden, ibid, 689. 
58 See Braine, n 16. 
59 Werbach, n 10, 30. 
60 Ortolani, n 35, 607. 
61 See Raskin, n 43, 7, 14. 
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court) at the occurrence of certain, predefined events. 62 This is the point in time at 
which further execution can be aborted or otherwise influenced, yet exclusively on 
the basis of pre-programmed options. 
Smart contracts can theoretically be combined and thus interact with one 
another in a decentralised and distributed structure, operating autonomously, ie 
without human intervention, once deployed by their programmers on the basis of 
the rules and mechanisms programmed into them.63 Such ‘decentralised 
autonomous organisations’ (DAOs) could even enter into new smart contracts 
with other market actors, creating a complex, evolving ecosystem of interacting 
agents linked by pre-determined, hard-wired and self-enforcing rules.64 They are 
not owned or controlled by any single person or corporation; yet they can interact 
with the market.65  
The most important DAO so far was created on the basis of smart 
contracts recorded and processed on the Ethereum network: ‘A humanless venture 
capital firm that would allow the investors to make all the decisions through smart 
contracts. There would be no leaders, no authorities. Only rules coded by humans, 
and executed by computer protocols.’66 It raised a spectacular 150m USD of 
which 50m were subsequently diverted by a malicious node to a private Internet 
address, leading to the project being abandoned.67 Still, similar projects may 
emerge in the future despite this failure. By contrast, it is not yet clear whether and 
to what extent the financial industry will develop an interest in such entirely 
autonomous, self-referential actors since, as for-profit organisations, they 
ultimately need to keep legal and economic ties with the device and exercise some 
control over it. In any case, the somewhat extreme concept of totally autonomous 
self-executing software shows that smart contracts stored on a blockchain network 
can operate in varying degrees of autonomy from humans and on a smaller or 
larger scale, providing input to one another in the form of reference data and 
triggering events, potentially across different blockchain networks. Obviously, the 
more intertwined smart contracts become and the lower the degree of control by 
humans, the more difficult it will be to govern this phenomenon.  
BLOCKCHAIN FINANCIAL NETWORKS AND STATE REGULATION 
                                                      
62 ibid, 24; see also text at n144-146.  
63 Wright and De Filippi, n 22, 15; Surden, n 51, 694-695. 
64 Stark, n 51; Wright and De Filippi, n 22, 17. 
65 Wright and De Filippi, n 22, 54. 
66 J.I. Wong and I. Karr, ‘Everything you need to know about the Ethereum “Hard Fork”’, Quartz (18 
July 2016), http://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-ethereum-hard-fork/, 
visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
67 See Wong and Karr, ibid. 
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The inventors of blockchain technology aimed at creating self-governing and 
state-remote networks, as epitomised by Bitcoin. Nobody should be able to 
interfere in the governance of the network from outside the circle of its nodes: in 
particular, States should be unable to censor or regulate it. Instead, internal 
processes are deemed to balance all the relevant interests so that no judicial or 
regulatory intervention is needed.68 Nevertheless, since blockchain-based virtual 
currencies provide individuals with a means of payment and an easy and near-
anonymous method of transferring value, States are considering relevant 
regulation, mainly targeting money laundering and terrorist financing.69 Beyond 
this very specific rationale, the role of blockchain financial networks in which 
securities, fiat money and derivatives are held could become so relevant in the 
future that societies will need to regulate and supervise them more consistently. 
Effective regulation requires a suitable addressee against which the rules 
can be enforced. In the case of virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, it appears 
difficult or well-nigh impossible effectively to regulate the person or persons 
controlling the software (which I here call the ‘software platform provider’) as they 
are typically informally associated individuals that may be scattered around 
different jurisdictions.70 Regulators could therefore attempt to regulate these 
networks by forcing local Internet providers to block the relevant data traffic.71 
However, this approach is only partly effective and politically and legally difficult 
to justify in a democratic setting as long as equally efficient, less intrusive means 
are at the regulators’ disposal. Against this background, regulatory initiatives at 
present target the intermediaries at the intersection between the virtual currency 
and the financial market, in particular the so-called virtual currency exchanges, ie 
those entities exchanging fiat money for virtual currency.72 Regulators could take 
the same approach in relation to blockchain financial networks on which 
securities, fiat money and derivatives are held and transferred. However, it is moot 
whether this approach would suffice, in particular as there might be risks in this 
context that can only be addressed for a blockchain financial network as a whole. 
This structural aspect will be touched upon in the following subsections but will 
                                                      
68 De Filippi and Loveluck, n 27, 3-4. 
69 See European Parliament, n 20); EU Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 [etc]’ (5 July 2016), COM(2016) 450 
final; New York Codes, Rules and Regulations, Title 23 Chapter I Part 200 – Virtual Currencies at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp200t.pdf. 
70 See De Filippi and Loveluck, n 27, 8-10; V. Lehdonvirta and R. Ali, ‘Governance and Regulation’, in 
UK Government Chief Scientific Advisor, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Blockchain (2016), 
42 at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-
16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
71 Wright and De Filippi, n 22, 51.  
72 EU Commission, n 69, 7; Lehdonvirta and Ali, n 70, 42. See New York State Regulation on Virtual 
Currencies (n 69) Section 200.2(q).  
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only be fully addressed in part five of this article, after the various material risks 
have been discussed. 
Hence, the main focus of the sections that follow will be on the material 
scope of regulation. As soon as financial assets such as fiat money, securities or 
derivatives are held and transferred through blockchain financial networks, the 
regulatory perimeter will need to extend to many more areas than just money 
laundering. This is due, first of all, to considerations of (market) scale: for the time 
being, transaction volumes in virtual currencies are tiny compared to those in 
financial assets.73 Then there is the question of interconnectedness: currently 
incumbent market participants, ie banks and other financial institutions are likely 
to become nodes in blockchain financial networks and to administer their and 
their clients’ financial assets on them.74 Potential negative externalities rooted in 
the operation of the relevant blockchain network, as discussed in the following 
section, will immediately impact on those financial institutions and their clients. 
For instance, if a blockchain financial network was to produce unexpected 
outcomes because of a software bug or loophole, all financial institutions using 
this network would instantly face the same operational difficulties, and there 
would be no option to work around them individually. Also, the connection to the 
real economy would become much more immediate since, unlike virtual 
currencies, financial assets embody claims against corporate and State debtors.   
I will analyse the following issues in turn. First, blockchain financial 
networks may influence the stability of financial markets. Secondly, self-
governance within a network may cause distortions that lead to discrimination 
against parties that are unable to adjust their behaviour. Thirdly, the possibility of 
transferring financial assets on blockchain networks may render anti-money-
laundering measures and similar rules partly ineffective.  
Resilience and financial stability 
Blockchain financial networks, like traditional market infrastructures such as 
clearing and settlement systems or central counterparties, could become 
systemically important in the future. Their function in the market places them 
among these critical infrastructures. Blockchain financial networks would provide 
a service that would not be easy to replace should they fail to function properly, as 
they would provide for the constitutive records of financial asset holdings, act as a 
repository for a variety of important data and as the platform on which smart-
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contract-based derivatives are executed.75 As networks linking a multitude of 
financial market actors, potentially of different types, they are also highly 
interconnected.76 For all these reasons, such networks are destined to become 
important in terms of financial stability once they have attracted a certain volume 
of assets and a critical number of users. It might therefore be necessary to regulate 
blockchain financial networks in order to ensure that they are resilient and do not 
contribute to systemic risk but, ideally, help to reduce it. There are a number of 
relevant aspects which I will address in turn below. 
Operational soundness and software loopholes  
The first concern is about the operational soundness and continuity of the relevant 
processes. Uncertainty as to the accuracy or availability of records or the correct 
execution of smart contracts could have significant repercussions for financial 
stability.77 The relevant hardware, ie the node-servers, and the individuals 
operating it are ‘distributed’ throughout the network, independent from each other 
and not centrally controlled – hence any concerns regarding integrity, availability, 
continuity, safety and accuracy relate to the software platform. Given its crucial 
importance for the nodes and their clients and for the market as a whole, there is a 
need for relevant regulation.78 
However, this issue extends far beyond the operational functioning of the 
network. A matter of equal importance is that the processing of transactions and 
the execution of smart contracts must result in the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ outcome. 
What is correct or true is not defined objectively according to absolute criteria 
obtained outside the network. Rather, the yardstick is consensus among nodes on 
how transactions should be processed and records kept. This consensus is typically 
established when nodes join the network and thereby adhere to the rules 
determining the acquisition and disposition of assets and the execution of smart 
contracts on the network (hereafter referred to as ‘internal rules’). These rules are 
laid down directly in the form of a computer code; there are no ‘bylaws’ or similar 
documents in human language.79 The internal rules may also be changed following 
the relevant internal governance procedures.80  
However, there is significant room for trouble. The software 
programming and user expectations may diverge, either because of an unintended 
                                                      
75 See Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures’ (April 2012), paras 1.3, 1.15 and 2.2 at 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid, Principles 15-17. See Peters and Panayi, n 3, 9-12. 
78 See New York State Regulation on Virtual Currencies (n 72), section 200.16. 
79 Lehdonvirta and Ali, n 70, 42. 
80 See below [000]. 
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loophole, ie a planned software functionality that produces, in combination with 
other functionalities, unexpected results, has been created due to the sheer 
complexity of the software platform (as was the case with the Ethereum-DAO 50m 
USD ‘theft’, which did not, technically speaking, occur because of an illegal 
intrusion into the software but as a result of the exploitation of a previously 
undetected loophole in the software),81 or because of a ‘bug’, ie a straightforward 
programming error.82 Ex ante regulatory measures to avoid such loopholes or bugs 
are important, also to ensure the transparency of the internal rules.83 However, 
loopholes and bugs can never be entirely avoided and they might affect all or 
significant parts of the assets held in the network. Therefore, systemic stability 
requires that ‘incorrect’ results in a blockchain financial network be prevented 
before they materialise or that there is at least a possibility to reverse such results. 
The programmers of Ethereum, to the surprise of many, were able to ‘reset’ past 
transactions and undo the abusive transfers.84 This approach obviously contradicts 
the original concept of immutable outcomes of blockchain-based transactions; 
however, as Ethereum has shown, it is necessary to protect the market at large from 
becoming hostage to a programming bug or loophole. Hence, it is questionable 
whether the original ideas regarding immutability will prove practicable as soon as 
blockchain technology is adapted for use in financial markets. 
Risk management 
In any case, independently from the question of whether a blockchain financial 
network provides for the correct outcomes, it can contribute to systemic risk. 
Blockchain networks record the assets of their users. These assets are part of a 
highly complex risk management process in which every significant financial 
market participant is constantly engaged. Risk management is a central, integral 
part of capital requirements regulation, and hence a centrepiece of the framework 
that governs financial markets.85  
The main mechanisms used to mitigate risk are delivery-versus-payment, 
security or collateral, set-off, closeout netting and multilateral clearing of 
exposures. In addition, financial institutions hedge their market risks using 
derivatives such as interest rate swaps.86 In principle, all these mechanisms could 
                                                      
81 See text to n 67. 
82 See European Parliament, n 20, para 2.a); Peters and Panayi, n 3, 10.  
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84 See text to n 67. 
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be programmed into the functionality of a blockchain financial network as smart 
contracts. However, in practice the technical hurdles are immense.  
The key difficulty is that risk mitigation spans different classes of asset: for 
instance, a simple delivery-versus-payment mechanism keeps a performance (eg a 
transfer of securities) on hold until the other party has likewise performed its part 
(ie made the corresponding cash payment), in order to release both at the same 
time, thereby eliminating the settlement risk. However, to do so requires both the 
securities leg and the cash leg of the transaction to occur in the same blockchain 
financial network, on pains of not being able to enforce the necessary 
interdependency with any certainty. Alternatively, if securities and cash were held 
in two different networks, both networks would need to be linked in operational 
terms.87  
The risk management of a financial institution is a highly complex thicket 
typically managed with the assistance of computer algorithms. Cash, securities, 
claims and derivatives are all inextricably connected through the mechanisms 
mentioned above, ie delivery-versus-payment, security, collateral, closeout netting, 
clearing and hedging. Therefore, modern risk management requires all these asset 
types and mechanisms to be available in a single network. Such a universal 
network would obviously raise questions of systemic risk in itself. The alternative 
to such a ‘leviathan’88 would be to have several networks where different asset 
types could be perfectly and unalterably linked through these risk mitigation 
functions—however, the resulting set-up would probably be extremely complex, 
requiring a high degree of standardisation and interoperability so that ultimately 
such a meta-network of blockchain financial networks would resemble the current 
situation in terms of complexity and proneness to error.  
Herding, flash crashes and supervisory stays 
The unstoppable execution of transactions and smart contracts in blockchain 
financial networks might also have effects akin to systemic dangers provoked by 
the phenomena of ‘herding’ or ‘flash crash’. The term ‘herding’ describes the 
synchronised behaviour of significant parts of the market as a reaction to certain 
market events. For instance, all hedge funds active in a given market segment may 
sell assets in the event of a sharply falling market, thereby amplifying the offending 
price movement. In extreme cases, herding may be one of the causes of so-called 
flash crashes, where extreme devaluation of an asset occurs in a very short period 
of time without any change in the underlying economic parameters. This 
phenomenon is typically due to identical behavioural patterns of the decision-
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makers or, where investment or risk mitigation decisions are outsourced to 
machines, to the use of algorithms that produce identical outcomes.89  
The autonomous and unstoppable execution of transactions and smart 
contracts in blockchain financial networks may aggravate this phenomenon. 
Removing the human element entirely eliminates the last vestiges of elasticity in 
the behaviour of parties, which does to some degree exist in wholesale financial 
markets due to the generally relational character of contracting prevailing in this 
environment.90 Eliminating elasticity may be advantageous from a market 
efficiency point of view in good times, but may also amplify market distortions in 
times of crisis.91 Blockchain technology takes the ‘immediateness’ of market 
reactions to an extreme and may combine it with a high degree of interdependency 
of the various processes involved. This could, in addition, cause unwanted 
feedback loops, especially in relation to the operation of smart contracts that 
execute autonomously on the basis of market data automatically retrieved from 
data sources.92 As a result, a single significant change in the market may 
immediately trigger another strong market move, which may in turn set off a third 
one, and so on. Hence, there is a need to assess blockchain financial networks and 
the potential of smart contracts in the light of rules addressing flash crashes and 
algorithmic trading.93 
 An additional issue is relevant in this respect: in order to be better 
prepared to prevent systemic risk caused by failures of banks or investment firms, 
recent legislation on bank resolution has established an administrative framework 
which is applied instead of judicial insolvency proceedings. Under this framework, 
supervisors are equipped with the authority to halt the execution of certain 
contract terms under certain circumstances and for a short period of time. The 
application of this ‘supervisory stay’ is intended to prevent the mass termination of 
derivatives and repurchase agreements in the event of failure of a bank or 
investment firm.94 Automatic, unstoppable execution of blockchain-based 
                                                      
89 See Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Significance and Impact of High-Frequency Trading in the German Capital 
Market’ (Monthly Report October 2016), 38-41, at 
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90 See text to n 142. 
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transactions would produce the exact opposite.95 In order to maintain the 
effectiveness of this administrative supervisory stay, the relevant authority would 
need to be provided with an ‘emergency stop’ function, enabling them to halt the 
automatic termination of contracts recorded in a blockchain financial network. 
Such functionality would need to be built into the smart contract itself, making the 
stay dependent on data input triggered by the relevant administrative decision.96 
By contrast, it would not be possible to allow the termination to happen and then 
afterwards ‘reverse’ it. First, because the termination would wipe out many 
derivatives and repurchase agreements that were important for the relevant bank’s 
risk management and secondly, because it would be difficult to find counterparties 
prepared to offer new contracts to the near-insolvent party on economically viable 
terms. 
Shadow banking risks and bubbles 
The emergence of blockchain financial networks and smart contracts may also 
influence the investment decisions made by market participants. Individuals or 
corporations may use the blockchain financial networks to store value, exchanging 
financial assets held with intermediaries for financial assets held in a blockchain 
network, in particular because of a perceived smaller risk, lower cost or better 
return as compared to more traditional ways of holding.97 As such, a blockchain 
financial network could also assume functions resembling those typically 
performed by banks, notably that of storing money.98 However, only the banks’ 
clients benefit from the relevant safety nets, such as deposit guarantees and access 
to central bank money for liquidity support. Blockchain financial network nodes 
do not benefit from these safety nets. If they act as intermediaries for clients 
outside the network, these clients are only protected if the node is a bank and the 
clients’ holdings are deposits or assimilated to deposits.99 The negative impact of 
adverse events on the market as a whole may be amplified by the fact that retail 
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customers could withdraw their savings from the traditional banking sector, 
thereby diminishing their liquidity base.100 Both phenomena may cause risks 
comparable to those produced by so-called shadow banking. 
Taking this thought a step further, the use of blockchain technology and smart 
contracts may cause a false impression of zero credit risk, because smart contracts 
allow for the immediate and autonomous enforcement of collateral should the 
obligor fail to perform. Collateral takers might assume that they are free to take on 
higher exposures, for example to lend more money, as there seems to be no risk of 
unenforceability of the collateral. 101 This assumed certainty is risky in itself. Risk-
takers will decrease their buffers in terms of reserves if they perceive a 
collateralised obligation to amount to zero risk. However, the uses of more 
efficient technology alone is poor justification for increased leverage in the 
financial system or, in other words, for stretching the liquidity cover of financial 
institutions even more thinly.102 
Internal governance and discrimination 
Bitcoin was originally conceived as a network comparable to a grassroots 
democracy. Its ‘libertarian’, anti-institutional motivation sat very well with the 
concept of a permission-less network open to all, where all information was public 
but users were generally anonymous, and where trust and mistrust where not an 
issue because strong cryptography and fail-safe processes made trust redundant. 
However, Bitcoin could not possibly have remained aloof in the long run from the 
ideology and private interests of its stakeholders and was progressively 
compromised by the social and cultural context in which the technology 
operated.103 In particular, the validation of blocks and the associated creation 
(‘mining’) of new bitcoins has grown into a business that is today characterised by 
low margins and thus by a high degree of market concentration on a few very 
powerful players; as a consequence, there are a handful of Bitcoin mining entities or 
associations that effectively control the network and have a large say in its further 
development.104 Also, a group of elite IT specialists run the system from a 
technical point of view, and these are effectively more influential than ordinary 
nodes given their superior knowledge and their role as gatekeepers between user 
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consensus and computer code.105 As a consequence, Bitcoin has evolved into a 
highly centralised network, ruled by an increasingly oligopolistic market 
structure.106 
 The internal governance of Bitcoin is, however, different from the internal 
governance of future blockchain financial networks set up by for-profit 
organisations such as banks, other financial institutions or Fintech companies. 
These networks will be set up either in a spirit of mutuality, assisting market 
participants to pursue common interests (in particular higher efficiency),107 or as 
services provided to wholesale or retail customers. Still, once blockchain 
technology finds its way into financial assets and services, users may play different 
functional roles in the relevant networks, such as ‘passive’ nodes that do not 
contribute to the functioning of the network, or as ‘active’ nodes contributing 
resources such as computing power,108 giving them less or more formal or 
informal influence on the relevant governance decisions. Nodes will also be 
dissimilar on other grounds, for example because they generate higher or lower 
transaction volumes, because they join the network at an earlier or later point in 
time, because they have different nationalities or reside in different territories, or 
because they may or may not participate in markets outside that particular network 
and, if they do, have different roles and importance there, too.  
Very much as in any other type of network, these differences will 
influence the degree of bargaining power of the network nodes when it comes to 
the internal governance of the network. Mindful of the fact that financial 
institutions associated in blockchain financial networks, while they will have some 
interests in common, are nevertheless competitors at various levels,109 bargaining 
power may be expected to be used to advance each node’s own economic goals by 
influencing the internal governance of the network, behaviour that may generate 
decisions detrimental to other, weaker, nodes. 
A blockchain financial network has several characteristics that are 
susceptible to discriminatory decision-making, thereby creating asymmetries within 
the network that could have a negative impact on the market as a whole. The most 
important such issue is that of actual access to a ‘permissioned’110 network, ie the 
possibility of excluding prospective new entrants or of only accepting them on 
unfair terms. Furthermore, processes and standards specific to the network, such 
as data formats or timelines, could be designed in such a way as to make it easier 
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for some nodes to comply with them than for others. Also, the network could be 
designed so as to ensure that some nodes are able to extract more sensitive 
information about the dealings of their competitors than vice versa. Lastly, 
standards for reporting transaction data to supervisors could be set so as to make 
compliance with regulation easier for some nodes than for others. There may be 
other examples. 
Such a situation may be acceptable from the public policy point of view so 
long as blockchain-based networks in financial markets do not become 
dominant.111 However, once they do, these asymmetries can lead to competitive 
distortions.112 Weaker nodes may be unable to adjust their behaviour, in particular 
for lack of alternatives. In that scenario, blockchain networks would come 
conceptually close to infrastructures underpinning the financial market, ie they 
would become akin to exchanges, settlement or payment systems. Such 
infrastructures, however, are subject to neutrality requirements in providing their 
services, even though they are currently for-profit organisations.113 Hence, 
comparable rules would need to apply in the future to blockchain financial 
networks, ie they should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria 
for participation, permitting fair and open access. 
Money laundering and other illegal activities 
Beyond the spectacular cases of illegal or illicit use of virtual currencies,114 
concerns about money laundering and terrorist financing surfaced very early on, 
leading to relevant regulation in New York and intense debate in Europe and 
elsewhere.115 Two characteristics inherent in blockchain technology considerably 
facilitate illegal activity. The first, and most obvious, is the possibility of 
transacting with a higher degree of anonymity than is afforded by account-based 
transfers,116 with the instantaneous character of international transactions making 
it impossible to know who sends and who receives, for instance, a payment in 
bitcoins.117 Secondly, even if blockchain-based networks were not generally 
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anonymous, there would be no-one on hand to perform the functions that lie at 
the core of anti-money-laundering and related regimes.118 In the ‘real’ world, that 
burden is placed on intermediaries, in particular banks and other financial 
institutions.119 They are held liable for identifying the parties to a transaction, 
including background due diligence extending to beneficial ownership of 
companies. They must report suspicious transactions to the competent authorities 
and in certain circumstances may be banned from executing such transactions.120  
In blockchain networks, intermediaries are not, in principle, needed.121 
There is a need for intermediation only where such networks intersect with the 
market outside. In the case of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, users exchange 
virtual money for fiat money or vice versa through entities called exchanges.122 As 
the virtual currency blockchain networks themselves are difficult to regulate, to 
date the exchanges are the most suitable entry points for regimes such as anti-
money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing laws,123 even though this 
approach would leave out any part of blockchain activity that did not involve an 
exchange of currency, such as, for example, activities where virtual currency is 
spent directly on goods and services.124 Still, this approach requires the recognition 
of virtual currency exchanges as regulated entities, which itself creates a whole 
new, publicly recognised sector within the financial market, raising further 
regulatory questions. Under the circumstances, no common strategy has emerged 
so far.125 There are no alternative ways of cracking down on illegal activity 
associated with state-remote networks by way of regulation. In particular, an 
outright ban seems to hold out scant promise as it is well-nigh impossible to 
enforce, except by blocking Internet traffic.126 In other words, although there 
certainly seems to be quite a problem, no suitable solution has as yet been found.  
As to future processing and recording of financial assets, in particular fiat 
money and securities, in blockchain networks, there is no room for a wait-and-see 
approach comparable to that taken towards virtual currencies.127 Regulators would 
be sending the wrong signals and incentivising a move to the unregulated part of 
the market if new entrants were to be subject to no or more lenient—and 
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therefore less costly—requirements purely on the ground that their business 
model was based on blockchain technology.128 Hence, transfers of money and 
other assets through blockchain financial networks need to be subject to 
functionally equivalent rules preventing money laundering and other illegal 
activities. It will make less and less sense for regulation to address intermediaries at 
the intersection between the blockchain networks and the traditional financial 
market since, as financial assets are moved to blockchain networks, the role of 
such intermediaries is likely to decrease. In practice, individuals will be able to 
transfer fiat money and other assets directly through a blockchain network, 
requiring no intermediary, much in the same way as no intermediary is needed to 
pay for goods in a virtual currency.129 
We are currently witnessing the creation of blockchain-based payment and 
money remittance services. The relevant service providers act as intermediaries, 
comparable to virtual currency exchanges in the Bitcoin context. They can be and 
are generally regulated.130 As a consequence, they are suitable addressees for anti-
money-laundering regimes and similar rules including user authentication (the so-
called ‘know-your-customer’ or KYC requirement).131 However, it needs to be 
clear who is responsible for applying these rules in cases where the role of 
intermediary is split or otherwise unclear, eg in cases where blockchain-based 
remittance services rely on local stores to pay in and withdraw cash.132 In that 
scenario responsibility can only fall to those controlling the platform, who 
therefore incur the full responsibility in terms of managing access and handling 
regulatory matters, as discussed below in part five.133 
AUTONOMOUS ALGORITHMS AND PRIVATE LAW 
One of the original traits at the basis of blockchain-based networks is that there is 
no trusted third person to effect and record transactions between nodes. In the 
world of blockchain, trust, which in the ‘real’ world is typically afforded to public 
authorities (such as the land register) or certain private parties (such as a bank or a 
notary), is replaced by reliance on software (see above, Part two). For the nodes to 
be able to rely on their network’s software, they must be convinced of its 
soundness, ie they must be confident that it allocates rights according to internal 
rules to which they agreed upon joining the network. At the same time, this 
principle entails that the process, once initiated, must be resistant to alteration and 
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beyond human control. Otherwise, again, parties would need to trust the person 
controlling the process. As a logical consequence, the allocation of rights in 
blockchain financial networks must be unstoppable and irreversible.  
However, the idea of such unstoppable and irreversible allocation in practice of 
individual rights to users creates tensions not only with the regulatory regime, as 
set out in Part three, but also with the private law framework. In the first 
subsection, I will discuss how the parties as well as the competent courts and 
regulators would lose authority over the enforceability of transactions or smart 
contracts once they were recorded on the blockchain. While the parties will 
themselves initially have agreed to this result, the second subsection will illustrate 
how their dealings may cause adverse externalities with regard to unrelated parties 
and the market as a whole, notably in respect of insolvency distribution and risk 
management. The authority to attribute rights in blockchain financial systems must 
therefore ultimately derive from the private law order, as explained in the third 
subsection.  
The trust-less order and the loss of authority of the courts over transaction 
enforceability  
A key component of blockchain is that the process of disposition and acquisition 
of assets and the execution of smart contracts is determined solely by the internal 
rules134 of the blockchain network. The algorithms directly produce the relevant 
effects. In this process, the rules are constantly called upon to ‘decide’ whether or 
not a certain transfer will be executed or whether the right of a party arising under 
a smart contract will be automatically enforced. However, in taking this ‘decision’, 
the software typically attributes rights to one party that it takes away from the 
other party. For instance, a smart derivatives contract might include a functionality 
causing it to terminate itself upon default or other types of termination event, 
automatically calculating and enforcing the amount still due from one party to the 
other, while at the same time transferring the associated collateral to the party that 
is ‘in the money’.  
Where the other party feels that the conditions for termination were not 
actually met it may decide to go to court. Where transactions are near-anonymous, 
as they are in first-generation blockchain applications, the story typically ends here 
as there is no way de facto of suing the other party for damages in kind or in money. 
Still, the parties may have previously agreed to an internal dispute settlement 
mechanism (which does exist, for instance, for online acquisitions paid with 
bitcoins).135 This mechanism applies the rules of the system, but not general 
private law, and necessarily results in an outcome compatible with the logic of 
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blockchain networks—which means that validated transactions and the execution 
of smart contracts cannot be undone on the record.136  
Even in permissioned systems, where the identity of users is known,137 
court decisions do not exert the same authority as in the traditional context of 
financial market transactions. Should a party claim that a transaction or smart 
contract that was executed under the internal rules of the network was 
unenforceable, the court will first consider whether the parties have agreed to the 
application of the internal rules to their dealings,138 as an expression of party 
autonomy, or even as a form of lex mercatoria.139 In that case, the code, or rather 
how it is understood in human language, would be the law, and every subsequent 
transaction would occur in accordance with it. In other cases, the court may hold 
that as a matter of general private law the transaction was unenforceable, eg 
because there was no valid agreement on the internal rules, or in case of a lacuna.  
However, even presupposing that there was a trusted entity controlling the 
network to whom the relevant court order could be addressed, the court will still 
be unable to order a rectification of the blockchain, as the record cannot be 
changed subsequently without destroying the logic of the trust-less network 
itself.140 The only remaining possibility is to claim damages from the transferee, in 
kind (ie the court may order the initiation of a new, reverse transaction) or in 
money. However, as is the case in traditional financial markets, claiming damages 
will often frustrate the transferor whose interests were overridden, in particular if 
the transferee has become insolvent in the meantime, or if the transferor has an 
interest in the specific assets which have been transferred. Yet, as opposed to the 
traditional environment, where registers can still be corrected and transactions 
operationally reversed in certain cases, the blockchain environment offers damages 
as the only remedy, invariably subjecting the transferor to the risk of insolvency of 
the transferee. 
This issue is also relevant in relation to smart contracts that are still open, 
where one party claims that the contractual duties should be adapted in response 
to new circumstances not previously considered by the parties, ie in case of a 
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lacuna.141 In the original blockchain setting, there is no way of changing the 
record, and thereby the contract,142 even in cases where both parties agree to the 
change. To revert to our earlier example: in the event of default in the context of a 
derivatives contract, the non-defaulting party too may often prefer not to 
terminate the contract and instead choose implicitly or expressly to adjust it, in 
particular by granting a grace period. Again, for lack of a trusted entity with the 
authority to change the record according to the parties’ agreement, the terms of 
the smart contract cannot be changed and its execution cannot be halted. A 
subsequent ‘reversal’ of the termination, by entering into a new contract, as a form 
of damages in kind, will often not be possible as the circumstances may have 
changed in the meantime, in particular where one of the parties has become 
insolvent or where market conditions have undergone considerable change. 
Thus, any kind of ex post review is limited to the potentially unsatisfactory 
possibility of claiming damages in court. Here, blockchain-held assets differ 
markedly from assets held in more traditional, account-based structures. Current 
financial market infrastructures, such as clearing and settlement systems, also use 
computer programmes to prioritise their users’ interests on the basis of their 
internal rules, as described above.143 However, outcomes can still be changed by 
the infrastructure operator, honouring the agreement of the parties or court 
orders, or simply correcting operational failures.  
Raskin argues that the precision of the programming language removes 
some of the potential need for ex post review, as the internal rules and in particular 
warranties and conditions can be formulated with much greater accuracy.144 
However, while this may indeed remove linguistic ambiguity, the greater precision 
is of little help in relation to issues such as changing circumstances, lacunae or 
even, depending on the applicable law, questions of equity or good faith.145 Rather, 
these issues could be addressed by leaving certain parts of the agreement outside 
the blockchain record as a ‘non-smart’ and thus modifiable contract, whereas 
other parts might ‘go smart’ and be self-executory and immutable, thereby 
building some flexibility into the relevant agreement.146 Alternatively, the code of 
the smart contract could become more granular, in an attempt to address all 
potential future circumstances that may have an impact on the contractual 
duties—an approach which, of course, may come close to, but ultimately will 
never achieve, perfection. 
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Third party effects and regulation at the intersection with private law 
The loss of control over the enforceability of rights is, in principle, acceptable in 
so far as the parties to a blockchain-based transaction and other users of that 
blockchain network are concerned. By adhering to the network, they have, 
implicitly or explicitly, agreed to operate in a technical, trustless environment, 
which only relies on maths and cryptography,147 and accepted that the internal 
rules determine the outcomes of their dealings.148 However, the effect on third 
parties outside the relevant blockchain network and on the market as a whole is 
more problematic.149  
The starting point is the question of whether relevant assets held in a 
blockchain financial network still belong to the insolvent estate, and hence are 
available to its creditors, or whether they are outside of it, notably because they 
have been validly transferred to an acquirer.150  What constitutes an asset of the 
insolvent is determined primarily by the general principles of property and 
contract law applicable to solvent parties.151 Hence, the internal rules of the 
blockchain network apply, still subject to certain rules from which parties cannot 
derogate, eg requirements for valid assignment or for perfecting security interests. 
However, since the rights of the insolvent’s general creditors (who are third parties 
unrelated to the blockchain network) are at stake, the court will also apply certain 
mandatory rules protecting the insolvent estate against an outflow of assets or 
guaranteeing the pari passu152 treatment of creditors.153 Hence, parties may be 
surprised to find a court or insolvency official avoiding transactions that have 
occurred within the blockchain financial network, and trying to ‘claw back’ the 
assets acquired much earlier in breach of these rules, or claiming damages.  
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Ortolani argues that in similar contexts, enforcement outside the court 
system on the basis of autonomous rules can be an efficient way of settling 
divergences of this kind, citing the case of attribution of Internet addresses by 
ICANN.154 This practice may seem acceptable in respect of Internet addresses, 
however, financial assets, as opposed to Internet addresses, are constantly traded 
and encumbered, ie they may, until insolvency strikes, continuously enter and 
leave the estate. In other words, when it comes to financial assets there is a much 
greater need to establish whether such earlier transactions occurred in breach of 
the pari passu or similar rules. 
Looking at the issue from the perspective of the solvent counterparty, 
other uncertainties become visible. Risk mitigation in financial markets is largely 
based on legal devices such as security, collateral, contractual termination, set-off 
and close-out netting, which generally feature in the parties’ contractual 
agreements. The effectiveness of risk mitigation depends on whether these 
contractual rights are enforceable as soon as the other party becomes insolvent. It 
is, however, unclear whether a court would regard these rights as enforceable 
where they arise from a smart contract recorded in a blockchain financial network. 
The fine balance established between contractual risk mitigation tools and 
mandatory insolvency law, as typically codified in so-called safe harbour rules, is 
very fragile.155 It has to reconcile contractual freedom with the interests of third 
parties and jurisdictions have typically adopted a strict line of policy in this respect. 
There is a significant danger that a court may consider this balance distorted if the 
strict mechanical execution of the stipulated contractual risk mitigation 
mechanisms in a blockchain financial network diverges, even if only slightly, from 
what is deemed acceptable generally. Contractual risk mitigation devices might be 
unenforceable as a consequence, derailing both parties’ risk management. 
This issue extends beyond private law into the sphere of financial 
regulation. Regulation attaches crucial importance to the enforceability of 
contractual risk mitigation, such as collateral, set-off and close-out netting. In 
particular, capital requirements are calculated on the basis of the net risk, ie the 
risk that remains after risk mitigation devices have been taken into account. Risk 
mitigation mechanisms can reduce a financial institution’s risk by up to 80 per 
cent.156 However, their risk-mitigating effect is only recognised under the Basel 
Accords and other regulatory texts to the extent that enforceability can be 
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guaranteed ex ante—in practice, financial institutions have to prove enforceability 
by providing reliable legal opinions to that effect.157 Otherwise, risk and, 
accordingly, capital requirements must be calculated on a gross basis, which the 
financial sector cannot afford. As a consequence, not only may private-law-based 
risk mitigation tools fail when they are actually needed, ie in the event of 
insolvency, but the uncertainty regarding the enforceability of these tools may also 
unravel any risk-focused regulatory regime such as, in particular, capital 
requirements linking back to questions of systemic stability, as discussed earlier.158 
Connecting internal rules to mandatory law 
The somewhat troubling outcome of the discussion above is that, on the one 
hand, the internal rules, in accordance with party agreement, produce results that 
cannot be changed subsequently, safe, at best, through claiming damages. On the 
other hand, the internal rules cannot displace mandatory law, in particular the 
insolvency avoidance rules or the prerequisites for a valid assignment or for 
perfecting security interests, which as a consequence still apply and may lead to 
unenforceability of transactions. However, the law cannot leave this obvious 
friction unaddressed and needs to bring the outcome under internal rules of 
blockchain financial networks into harmony with the relevant law. The neatest way 
is to recognise the operation of internal rule in the law itself.  
This can be achieved by expressly recognising the outcome under the 
internal rules of a blockchain financial network as enforceable against third parties. 
However, this effect can only be granted to networks on condition that the 
relevant internal rules of the network treat dispositions and acquisitions so as to be 
compatible with general principles of law, actually making them a vehicle for the 
law. In particular, outcomes may not be arbitrary but instead must be based on 
objective criteria, such as chronology, publicity and specificity. In relation to 
insolvency avoidance, the law should recognise the reality of the immutable record 
and state that transactions on a blockchain financial network, once initiated, 
cannot be unwound or reversed by the blockchain network, unequivocally 
referring parties to a claim for damages as the only remedy. 
The relevant legal provisions need to be statutory, in order to rank equally 
with the mandatory provisions they seek to address. Such rules do exist at the 
moment, notably in respect of the enforceability of acquisitions and dispositions 
as the outcomes of automated clearing processes for cash or securities, generally 
called ‘finality’.159 These rules can serve as blueprints for legal provisions 
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connecting the internal rules of blockchain financial networks to mandatory rules 
of law.160 
Secondly, and this is the more difficult part, accepting outcomes as 
enforceable generally means that there might still be exceptional circumstances, 
think of the Ethereum case, that cast doubt on whether the execution can actually 
be backed by private law, even if the internal rules are generally deemed to be in 
line with it. For instance, a software loophole may produce a result that is 
incompatible with the principles underlying the network rules, which are, in turn, 
recognised by the law. The network itself may function correctly but the market 
environment may be derailed as a consequence of the unexpected outcome.161 The 
fact that the enforceability of acquisitions is supposed to be in harmony with the 
law somehow suggests that there must still be a way of undoing transactions and 
changing the blockchain, if only in exceptional circumstances. In other words, as 
soon as financial assets are held in blockchain financial networks, the law needs to 
give guidance on how to handle an incident of the Ethereum type wherever 
networks administering financial assets are concerned. 
DETERMINANTS FOR A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
The preceding two parts identified a number of open questions in areas where the 
character of blockchain financial networks presents specific challenges to financial 
regulation and private law. As discussed earlier, the concept of blockchain is still 
evolving and different types of network will pose greater or smaller challenges in 
terms of governance, and some types may even be entirely unproblematic in this 
respect. 162 
However, legal and regulatory arrangements cannot be tailor-made for 
each blockchain network. Therefore, in the following, I will discuss two central 
issues that cut across the ‘material scope’ of regulation and private law discussed 
earlier, in particular the structure of blockchain financial networks and the 
importance of the cross-jurisdictional view. These two aspects are the main 
determinants for the effective design and implementation of a regulatory and legal 
framework capable of governing different types of network. 
Structure of the network 
The preceding two chapters have shown that blockchain financial networks need 
to be regulated on several counts, and that ultimately private law needs to apply 
within these networks. But how can regulation and private law be extended to 
blockchain financial networks in the most efficient manner? Disintermediation, 
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leading to the abolition of accounts and intermediary-client relationships more 
generally will render traditional regulatory strategies largely inefficient and remove 
an important element to which private law rules traditionally attach. Instead, we 
must focus on what actually replaces the two-party relationship: a distributed 
network, built on poly-directional relationships among its nodes, which are linked 
solely through a software platform. Hence, regulation and law could target the 
software platform or the nodes, or both. 
Platform providers163 for first-generation blockchain applications are 
generally informally organised groups of individuals. Today, Fintech start-ups, 
well-established financial institutions and infrastructures, and even central banks 
may venture into setting up blockchain financial networks. There are a number of 
regulatory and legal aspects that can only be addressed for a blockchain financial 
network as a whole, regardless of how the circle of nodes is made up. The 
platform provider is the only suitable point of entry for network-wide regulatory 
and legal rules.164 Starting from basic requirements regarding safety, availability, 
integrity and continuity of service, any rules that can only be implemented 
centrally must be imposed on the platform provider. As a consequence, platform 
providers need to be legal persons (natural persons are too elusive) regulated by 
the State. There may still be state-remote, unregulated blockchain networks where 
the platform is provided under a more informal arrangement, such as for Bitcoin or 
Ethereum. However, it should be impossible to issue securities through these 
networks and they should not be dealing with fiat money. To achieve this goal, it is 
not necessary to close them down or block access to their websites. It is sufficient 
to prohibit regulated financial institutions from dealing with such networks.  
Platform providers have to ensure the soundness and continuity of the 
software platform.165 Most importantly, this includes aligning the internal rules 
governing the acquisition of rights and the execution of contracts with private 
law.166 Turning the spotlight onto issues of systemic stability, the platform 
provider has to help prevent flash crashes and bubbles, not only by shaping the 
software accordingly but also by providing for relevant reporting mechanisms.167 
Furthermore, in case of a permissioned network,168 the platform provider must 
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administer admission to the network,169 ensuring non-discriminatory access to it170 
and respecting relevant restrictions as to the circle of users or as to territorial 
reach.171  
Whether the platform provider should be the addressee of all relevant 
regulatory or legal rules depends on who the nodes of the blockchain network are: 
if the circle of nodes consists exclusively of regulated financial institutions (which 
may act as intermediaries and therefore maintain account-based relationships with 
clients172), the regulatory burden can be shared between them and the platform 
provider. In this case, regulatory and legal rules that do not need to be 
implemented centrally are addressed to nodes.173 Generally, regulated financial 
entities will already be subject to relevant rules, such as an anti-money-laundering 
regime. However, relevant nodes must be authorised for the specific type of 
service provided by the network. For instance, if the network provides payment 
services, nodes authorised as banks will automatically be subject to all relevant 
regulation. Obversely, in a network administering securities, nodes authorised as 
payment services providers alone are not sufficiently regulated. 
Where the nodes of a given network are entities not regulated as financial 
institutions, or individuals, the situation is completely different. In this case, there 
are no intermediaries that could apply relevant regulation to their relationships 
with clients. The only entity capable of applying the relevant regulation to the 
network and its nodes is the platform provider itself. In that situation, the 
platform provider would need to be the addressee of the full range of relevant 
regulatory and legal rules, thereby becoming a fully regulated financial institution 
itself which does not,174 however, maintain accounts with its nodes but controls 
the network through means of access control and programming of the network 
software. 
Thus, ‘structure’ as the first determinant refers to who the nodes of a 
network are and what services it provides. As a rule of thumb, the application of 
regulatory and private law rules to blockchain financial networks requires less 
adaptation of existing rules to the extent that such networks are homogeneous as 
regards their circle of nodes and the services provided. For example, a network 
specialising in payments that has as its nodes only authorised payment service 
providers or banks will not pose any great problem from the point of view of 
                                                      
169 See above, [000]. 
170 See above, [000]. 
171 See below, [000]. 
172 See text to n 29. 
173 See New York State Regulation on Virtual Currencies n 72 above, Section 200.8 (capital 
requirements), 200.9 (custody and protection of customer assets), 200.15 (anti-money laundering rules), 
200.19 (consumer protection). European Commission, n 69, 7.  
174 See Bitstamp, www.bitstamp.net/payment-institution-license/, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
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regulation and private law. By contrast, a network for clearing securities transfers 
against cash settlement that also offers collateral management and has both non-
financial corporations and regulated financial institutions as its nodes will be 
significantly more complicated to govern.  
Domestic and cross-jurisdictional reach of networks 
Financial markets are highly internationalised, whereas their governance is still 
largely defined on the basis of territorial criteria. States exert regulatory and 
supervisory authority over the activity of financial institutions on their territory, 
and the law governing dealings between market participants can only be chosen to 
some extent, being imposed on the basis of territorial considerations for a number 
of important issues. Therefore, the effective governance of blockchain financial 
networks requires a strategy explaining how the regulatory and legal solutions, 
which are limited in their territorial reach, can be applied to networks that are 
potentially spread across several countries. This paper has already shown that 
issues of regulation and private law are inextricably linked in some respects.175 This 
linkage is also an important element in overcoming the discrepancy in terms of the 
reach of a blockchain network and the means of governance. In particular, the 
enforceability of rights must be made dependent on the effective regulation of the 
relevant blockchain network in its own jurisdiction. I will first look at the public 
law side of the issue before turning to private law questions. 
Cross-jurisdictional regulation and supervision 
Access to internet-based financial services is difficult to contain and control by 
local supervisors. They may be unable to regulate and supervise a service 
effectively because the platform provider and the nodes are not located in the 
same jurisdiction.176 Outright prohibitions are theoretically possible but difficult to 
justify—investors are ultimately free to risk their own money—and hold out scant 
promise of effective enforcement unless online access is blocked.177 Mechanisms 
to dis-incentivise the use of foreign blockchain financial services are probably 
more efficient—here, regulatory approval of certain blockchain financial networks 
can of itself be such an incentive. 
 Many blockchain financial networks will aim at an international, or even 
global, circle of users. However, being regulated in one jurisdiction does not 
generally satisfy regulators in other jurisdictions. The EU is in an exceptional 
position in that it has an effective common framework already in place: the EU 
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‘passport’ is linked to the authorisation and continued supervision of financial 
services providers in their home Member State and is in principle also good for 
providing the same service in other EU jurisdictions.178 A blockchain financial 
network, through its platform provider, could be a beneficiary of the passport, 
which argues very much in favour of having a platform provider authorised as a 
financial institution of the relevant type, eg as a payment service provider.179  
Outside the EU, mutual recognition of authorisation and other 
supervisory decisions is close to anathema. As a fall-back option, a blockchain 
financial network could remain restricted to nodes within one jurisdiction, or seek 
authorisation in all jurisdictions relevant for its business. Alternatively, the market 
could be restricted to countries that do not require providers of the relevant 
service to be licensed (which would largely exclude the US and the EU, as they 
have regulatory regimes in place for just about every kind of financial service). 
Neither solution is conducive to innovation. However, at the moment, there seem 
to be no alternatives and blockchain financial networks will need to go through 
the motions of obtaining multiple authorisations. A set of international standards, 
which could borrow rules from texts developed for other types of market 
infrastructure,180 would serve regulatory convergence and thus facilitate the 
authorisation process for blockchain financial networks seeking to establish 
themselves in several jurisdictions.  
Obviously, this is a highly sensitive issue for London-based financial 
innovators should the UK leave the EU internal market as a consequence of the 
imminent termination of its EU membership. UK-based financial service 
providers will lose their passports and be treated as third country entities. They 
may decide to establish a locally incorporated and supervised subsidiary in a EU-
27 State that would then allow them to benefit from an EU passport. Still, for UK 
entities, the process of authorisation would be facilitated as long as the relevant 
UK rules are in line with EU rules—however, this is an advantage that, after the 
loss of passporting privileges, would need to be formalised under a separate 
regime certifying equivalence of standards on a case-by-case basis.181    
                                                      
178 See European Banking Authority, ‘Passporting and Supervision of Branches’, 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/passporting-and-supervision-of-branches, visited 30 
Nov. 2016. 
179 See above, [000] and n 174. 
180 See Bank for International Settlements, n 75. 
181 See European Commission, ‘Equivalence with EU Rules and Supervision’ at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
finance/general-policy/global/equivalence/index_en.htm; ‘Equivalence Decisions taken by the 
European Commission’, at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/global/equivalence-
table_en.pdf; visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
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Cross-jurisdictional co-ordination of private law 
The international framework supporting the enforceability of financial assets in 
foreign jurisdictions is rudimentary and non-binding.182 There is a binding, albeit 
fragmentary, private law framework covering this area in place in the EU, which 
despite some harmonisation of aspects of substantive law is built on a conflict-of-
laws solution. This means that domestic laws continue to apply under a conflict-
of-laws regime that co-ordinates their application.183 More ambitious international 
harmonisation of the legal framework for assets and contracts recorded in a 
blockchain network is unlikely to happen, particularly where the harmonisation of 
mandatory law is concerned.184 Rather, autonomous national laws, ideally 
coordinated by a set of global principles, key attributes or some other type of 
benchmark will retain their authority over such assets and contracts.  
Such a framework would involve three main threads, which I will address 
in turn below. In particular, it must be possible clearly to identify the law of which 
State is to apply to the assets held and smart contracts recorded in a blockchain 
financial network; the law so identified should determine the validity and 
enforceability of these assets and contracts also in foreign insolvency proceedings; 
and, for both of these, the jurisdiction of the applicable law must follow a number 
of standards regarding the legal and regulatory treatment of blockchain financial 
networks. 
Applicable law 
The enforceability of a right in a financial asset depends on the law applicable to 
that concrete right, which, in turn depends on the legal nature of the relevant 
asset. However, there is little international compatibility as to the legal nature of 
even the most common financial assets. The right of an investor in non-corporeal 
securities electronically held in accounts is a case in point, as it is regarded as 
beneficial ownership in England, whereas most other jurisdictions classify the right 
of the investor as ‘full’ property in securities or shared property in a pool thereof, 
or as an insolvency-proof claim against the relevant intermediary with no legal 
                                                      
182 Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an 
Intermediary (‘Hague Securities Convention’), www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act= 
conventions.text&cid=72; Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities 
('Geneva Securities Convention'); 
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Law on Secured Transactions (2016), 
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_on_ST_ebook.pdf. 
183 Settlement Finality Directive (n 143) Articles 8 and 9; Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on 
Financial Collateral, Article 9; Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
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connection to the underlying securities.185 Another example are registered shares, 
which are choses in action in English law, for which, however, no corresponding 
concept exists in many other jurisdictions, which may classify them as property in 
a movable, or rights in rem.186 By the same token, the right to money in a bank 
account, under English law, is a personal claim that can be traced to an onward 
acquirer and therefore has a proprietary trait,187 whereas it has no proprietary 
attributes in other jurisdictions.   
Cutting through this thicket merits a study of its own,188 but the point I 
wish to make here is that no international blockchain financial network can work 
if every jurisdiction involved were to classify the asset held in the network in 
accordance with its own idiosyncratic criteria. At present, international transfers of 
financial assets operate through accounts, ie they are two-party relationships, and a 
court would determine the nature of the right in question according to the law that 
applies to that specific account.189 However, in blockchain networks, there are no 
accounts,190 hence the question of which law applies to a right in an asset or 
flowing from a contract needs to be defined for the entire network en bloc.  
Following the lex rei sitae rule, the law applicable to assets and rights held 
in a blockchain network would be that of the location of the nodes. As this would 
lead to the application of different laws within the network, this approach is 
excluded. The alternative approach of lex societatis (in the case of shares) or lex 
contractus (in the case of bonds) may likewise result in the application of different 
laws within a network. Hence, the only suitable solution is to define that law for 
the network as a whole and to do so from the outset, either as a function of the 
jurisdiction that regulates the platform provider and hence the network, or on the 
basis of the initial choice of law made by the platform provider. That law would 
then flow into the design of the internal rules of the network, determining how 
assets are transferred and rights are executed. However, in order to avoid forum 
shopping, the choice of law should be restricted, in particular to jurisdictions 
                                                      
185 See J.S. Rogers, ‘Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Art. 8’ (1995-96) 43 UCLA Law Review, 1449-
59; L. Afrell and K. Wallin-Norman, ‘Direct or Indirect Holdings – A Nordic Perspective’ (2005) 
Uniform Law Review 10(2-3), 277-284; F. Nizard, Les titres négociables (Economia et Banque Revue, 
Paris 2003), 245-252; J. Benjamin, Interests in Securities (Oxford University Press, 2000), 3-59. 
186 See J. Benjamin, Financial Law (Oxford University Press 2007), para 3.22. 
187 Foley v Hill (1848) 2HLC (HL), Cottenham LC at 36; Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102, Millet LJ 
at 108-109, 126-129; see T. Cutts, ‘Tracing, Value and Transactions’ (2016) Modern Law Review 79(3) 
(2016), 381, 384. 
188 See Paech, Securities, Intermediation and Blockchain, n 25, 1-19. 
189 See Financial Collateral Directive, n 183, Article 9; Settlement Finality Directive, n 143, Article 9; 
Hague Securities Convention, n 182, Article 4. 
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where the platform provider is incorporated or has a major operation.191 This 
approach is also followed by the EU Settlement Finality Directive, following 
which only the law of a Member State can be chosen to govern the rights within 
the system.192 Hence, as a consequence of ‘Brexit’, English law may in the future 
be ineligible for settlement systems operating in the EU. Should the EU legislate in 
respect of blockchain financial network, it seems likely that, as an analogy, the 
choice of law will be restricted in a similar way. Hence, from an EU perspective, 
English law could not be chosen as the law governing the relevant rights. 
Recognition under the lex fori concursus 
The acid test, however, is whether the relevant rights are also enforceable should 
one of the nodes become insolvent. In that case, enforceability is traditionally 
determined by the lex fori concursus, typically identified on the basis of a location-
based connecting factor. As a result, the forum could be the jurisdiction of any of 
the nodes of a blockchain network.193 To achieve legal certainty as to the 
enforceability of the rights, it would be crucial for all these jurisdictions to 
consider enforceability on the basis of the law of the network, also in the event of 
insolvency of the relevant node.  
However, this is not a given. While the courts in insolvency proceedings 
will generally recognise the enforceability of earlier acquisitions and dispositions of 
the insolvent and of the contracts into which it has entered, even if these are 
governed by a foreign law, there are stark differences as to detail. In particular 
where courts feel that a specific arrangement impinges on the equal treatment of 
creditors (pari passu principle) as understood by their own law, they may regard the 
rules of their own jurisdiction as mandatory and any diverging effect under a 
different law as unenforceable.194 Whereas outright dispositions and acquisitions 
are typically not particularly ambiguous, and contractual rights to performance 
generally accepted, difficulties may arise where the parties arrange for security 
(such as a pledge, mortgage, or lien) in assets held in a blockchain network, where 
financial collateral is provided (including mechanisms such as margining, 
substitution and right of use), or where contractual termination rights, set-off or 
close-out netting are stipulated.195  
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These issues are as a rule problematic in international settings, and much 
of the legal detail to be considered in the context of risk mitigation is owed to 
these jurisdictional differences. The financial industry has learned to manage the 
legal risk involved, notably commissioning legal opinions covering all relevant 
scenarios to achieve an acceptable degree of ex ante legal certainty. However, in a 
scenario involving an international blockchain financial network, this approach 
will probably be less effective. At present, a party considers its risk in two-party 
relationships (with the counterparty, and with the intermediaries holding or 
transferring the relevant cash and securities, including collateral). If the relevant 
rights are enforceable in insolvency, the risk is considered acceptable. This ‘risk 
architecture’ will be changed where a blockchain financial network is involved. 
The enforceability of rights held in the network becomes the point of reference; 
however, each jurisdiction will develop its own conditions as to the enforceability 
of assets and contracts held in a blockchain network. In principle, the problem is 
not in any way structurally different from the legal uncertainties currently faced by 
the financial industry in cross-jurisdictional situations. However, it will remain 
unclear for quite some time which path legislators and courts will take, leading to 
uncertainty in the transition period. The financial industry will be unable to 
address the uncertainty arising from the shift towards assets and contracts 
recorded in international networks as long as the legal framework is unclear.  
The best solution in terms of supporting changes to statutory laws is to 
agree among jurisdictions that assets and contracts recorded in a blockchain 
financial network are enforceable also in insolvency, and that this is subject to the 
limitations set by the law governing the network, rather than by the limitations set 
by each lex fori concursus. Thus, nodes would not need to worry about the 
specificities of the insolvency laws in all jurisdictions where fellow nodes are 
located, but only about the limits imposed by the law that governs the network 
and its internal rules.  
Trading enforceability in return for a common regulatory standard 
This solution is, however, politically sensitive because the lex fori concursus would 
lose authority over the policy-laden aspect of creditor protection in insolvency. 
Contractual derogation from this core area of insolvency law is, as a rule, 
impossible.196 However, by accepting that the law that governs the network 
overrides the local insolvency law, nodes are somehow given the option, if not to 
derogate from insolvency law altogether, to choose the insolvency law of another 
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country in respect of the assets held in the blockchain financial network. There are 
precedents in EU law,197 which could serve as a model.  
Yet the possibility of derogating from local insolvency law in favour of a 
foreign law would be highly significant, as it potentially concerns a large part or 
even all of an insolvent’s assets and contracts held in a blockchain network. 
Hence, it may not be possible to envisage such a shift unless all jurisdictions 
concerned agree on common standards for regulating blockchain financial 
networks. As shown in the preceding two parts, risk-based regulation and private 
law enforceability are closely linked, so that such standards would also extend to 
the regulation of the internal rules of the network governing the acquisition and 
disposition of rights and the execution of contracts. Only if jurisdictions were to 
agree on such a common standard might the concession of a chosen insolvency 
law be acceptable from an insolvency policy point of view. Regulation and private 
law would thus result in a closed system on the international scale, as they typically 
do domestically. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial market activity conducted through blockchain networks poses risks 
very similar to those existing in the current, intermediary-based market: there are 
issues regarding resilience and financial stability, market distortion and illegal 
activity. At the same time, a future blockchain environment will face private law 
questions similar to those the market faces now, in particular regarding the 
enforceability of rights in insolvency, which is a linchpin of risk mitigation and 
risk-related regulation. The governance rationale for blockchain-based financial 
market activity therefore largely corresponds to the axioms of the existing 
governance framework. Thus, blockchain financial networks need to be subject to 
a functionally equivalent regulatory and legal framework. 
The distributed record, capable of storing complex information such as 
auto-executable financial transactions, will bring immense efficiency gains to 
financial markets. The facilitation of financial services brought about by this new 
type of database will reduce the operational burden and hence decrease reliance on 
intermediaries and infrastructures. At the same time, the use of distributed 
databases does not per se pose any insurmountable problems in terms of regulation 
or private law.  
However, other features of the original, Bitcoin-inspired, model of 
blockchain-based networks are unsuitable for use in financial markets from the 
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point of view of effective governance. This is because existing regulatory strategies 
and legal concepts are largely ineffective if applied to applications that replicate the 
characteristics introduced by Bitcoin. First, many highly complex regulatory and 
legal functions in the market are at present taken care of on a small scale, 
fundamentally in two-party relationships. That intermediary-client approach, one 
of the cornerstones of regulation, is certainly inefficient to some degree, and a 
distributed, all-encompassing database may be more efficient and less costly. 
However, it would seem that some complex governance questions can actually be 
better referred to a bilateral relationship, as financial services will always remain 
connected to individual circumstances: for example, anti-money-laundering 
compliance is necessarily an individual process. Furthermore, the private law that 
applies to individual clients will generally be a local law, no matter what law applies 
within the networks through which transactions are administered. Hence, some 
forms of two-party relationship and, therefore, a certain layer of intermediation, 
will persist even if the market moved to a blockchain-based setup. 
Secondly, there is no ex post judgment within Bitcoin-like networks 
regarding the enforceability of rights arising in these networks. This would make 
financial networks incompatible with basic societal perspectives. It is true that 
unstoppable, irreversible self-execution provides more certainty and lowers cost; 
however, it also entails a total loss of elasticity of behaviour. Elasticity can have its 
positive sides and is always coupled with institutional and personal responsibility; 
therefore certainty of execution is not an absolute argument. More importantly, an 
environment consisting of self-executing contracts and irreversible, computer-
induced transactions lacks the element of legal and moral responsibility, which is a 
fundamental building block of our social order, depriving society from one of its 
means to implement its policy goals, including insolvency distribution and other 
rules that protect the interests of third parties and the market as a whole. 
In other words, elasticity in decision-making and the existence of ex post 
judgment are the necessary flipside of a system that is to some degree uncertain 
and inefficient, such as that currently in place. A perfect system could do without 
judgment, elasticity and responsibility and rely instead on strict, self-enforcing, 
immutable rules. However, a perfect system would consist, first, of a one hundred 
per cent fail-safe blockchain network (which cannot exist), which, secondly, 
administered the assets of all parties so that there would no third parties left to be 
adversely affected. Otherwise, the risk of failure is merely shifted to non-adjusting 
parties which are those not using the blockchain network, a group which 
experience shows may consist mainly of non-financial creditors and society as a 
whole. Some may support a development in that direction and see such an all-
encompassing blockchain-based ‘world computer’ as the necessary complement to 
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the Internet of Things and the algorithmic enhancement of our life experiences.198 
However, such a leviathan is conceptually impossible, as there will always be 
interests outside the network that general laws and social norms need to protect, 
quite apart from the consideration that it would by no means be a desirable 
development. 
The good news is that the financial industry does not plan to dispose of 
these elements entirely. There is a general understanding that blockchain-based 
financial networks should operate within the reach of law, courts and supervisors. 
So far, however, the potential negative externalities of increased certainty inside 
the network on the world outside have not been sufficiently acknowledged. Yet 
such recognition is the prerequisite for the regulatory and legal integration of 
blockchain-based financial services. It mainly entails setting boundaries on the 
blockchain characteristics of immutability and unstoppable execution. 
As a result, the expected blockchain revolution will primarily be a 
technological one, introducing new ways of transaction processing, recording and 
reporting that will render the financial market significantly more efficient. As far as 
the governance of blockchain networks is concerned, the current strategies will 
remain largely the same. Accordingly, state-remote networks, ie networks similar 
to Bitcoin or Ethereum, cannot serve as models for blockchain financial networks. 
By contrast, governments would be well advised to cooperate in creating a 
supportive governance framework for regulated networks to ensure that 
blockchain technology can be used for the benefit of the market as a whole.   
 
                                                      
198 See Ethereum, ‘Ethereum: The World Computer’ (video), at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j23HnORQXvs, visited 30 Nov. 2016. 
